Empirical studies suggest that entry of generic competitors results in minimal decreases or even increases in brand-name drug prices as well as sharp declines in brand-name advertising. This paper examines circumstances under which this empirical pattern could be observed.
I. Introduction
Over the past twenty years public policy makers have often Wagner and Duff y (1988) examined price changes for top selling generics and name brands. They show substantial price increases in brand name prices accompanying large reductions in generic prices as entry of generics occurs. Grabowski and Vernon (1990) examined data on 18 major orally-administered drug products subject to generic competition between 1983 and 1987, and found that the name brand price increased by an average of 7% one year subsequent to generic entry and 11% two years following generic entry.
The main goal of this paper is to examine how entry by generics can lead to price increases for brand name drugs. We take as a point of departure the observation made frequently by others Caves 1988, Wagner and Duffy 1988, U.s. Congress Special Committee on Aging 1990, Grabowski and Vernon 1990 ) that the demand side of the market for prescription drugs consists of two segments. One segment (consisting largely of hospitals, 1*lOs and Medicaid patients) is sensitive to differences between brand-name and generic prices, while the other (mainly comprised of individuals purchasing drugs in a retail outlet based on prescriptions from office-based physicians), is not sensitive to these price differences.1 We examine models based on this characterization of demand to determine the circumstances under which price increases in response to market entry by generics will occur! 1 Medicaid is a major purchaser of pharmaceutical products.
A number of states will only reimburse sellers for the price of a generic product if one exists. Others deny reimbursement for costly drug products. The reimbursable products are listed in a state's Medicaid formulary.
2Grabowski and Vernon (1990) offer a specific example where a profit-maximizing firm would increase price in response to entry. Our purpose is to provide a more general characterization of the A second facet of our analysis concerns the simultaneous response of brand-name advertising and brand-name price to generic entry. Since there is some evidence from two recent studies (Hurwitz and Caves 1988; Caves, Whinston and Hurwjtz 1991) that advertising tends to fall with generic entry, we explore the conditions under which this can occur in tandem with a positive price response to entry.
The paper is organized into five sections. The next section presents a simple brand name pricing model based on market segmentation. In addition to describing the conditions under which generic entry increases brand-name price in this model, we also consider whether recent institutional trends in the health sector, which are changing the relative magnitudes of the two segments of market demand, will alter these conditions. The simple model is extended to incorporate advertising in the third section. The fourth section reviews recent empirical evidence of price increasing entry and advertising responses to entry. A final section offers conclusions and observations on future research and policy directions.
II. A Simple Market Segmentation Model

A. Background
We noted above that one could view the demand for brand-name prescription drugs as composed of two segments, one in which buyers are sensitive to prices of generic equivalents and one in cases where this would be true. There have been a number of models in the literature that are concerned with entry which leads to price increases in oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive markets (Rosenthal 1980 , Salop 1979 and Satterthwaite 1979 . These models generate price increases in response via one of two general mechanisms. The first is to assume economies of scale (Salop 1979) . A second approach is for entry to both shift demand curves and to make them less elastic (Rosenthal 1980 and Satterthwaite 1979) . Our analysis takes the second general approach.
The PPS system bases its payments on the national historical average costs of care for patients falling into each of approximately 470 diagnostic clusters. In addition, hospitals may receive special adjustments to their payment rate based on whether they are teaching hospitals, serve disproportionate shares of indigent patients etc.
costs. Stolar (1988) reports that from 1985 to 1987 the portion of hospitals with a policy of an automatic exchange of therapeutic alternatives, based on price, increased from 47.5% to 52.5%. In addition the percentage which placed restrictions on certain high cost drugs grew from 25.7% in 1985 to 27.7% in 1987. These data suggest that a significant share of hospitals are making generic vs. brand name price comparisons in pharmaceutical purchasing, and that this share is growing over time.
A second part of the cross-price sensitive segment of the market for pharmaceuticals consists of Health Maintenance Organizations (liMOs). liMOs provide health care coverage and services for roughly 11% of the U.S. population (Interstudy 1989) . They generally offer relatively extensive coverage for prescription pharmaceuticals (Gold et al 1989) . Since liMOs receive a fixed payment for providing individuals with an agreed upon set of health care services (usually with little or no cost sharing), WIGs usually receive no marginal revenue associated with any services. The 11110's incentive is to treat each case as economically as possible. HNOs are therefore likely to be sensitive to generic vs. brand name price differences. This is supported by data from Weiner et al. (1989) that on average 31% of all liMO pharmacy claims are for generics, while in insurance plans that cover fee-for-service medical practice the generic share of claims is only about Research by Statman (1981) and Bond and Lean (1977) suggest that physicians have considerable loyalty to name brand drugs regardless of price. This is in part evidenced by very low 5 A recent survey of HMOs (Doering 1988) (Kushner and Feirman 1986) . One approach is to set reimbursement levels to pharmacists for drugs at the price of the generic products in the chemical class, if they exist. Another approach, used by one third of the states, is to define a set of drugs for which Medicaid will reimburse sellers. Some very costly drugs are excluded from this Medicaid formulary and are therefore not eligible for reimbursement (Dranove 1989 ).
B. Assumptions
Our analysis of brand name price responses to market entry begins by assuming that the brand name producer is a dominant firm that incorporates price responses of generics to its own pricing decisions while the generic producers are fringe fins that take the brand name price as given.
(Thus, our model is a Stackelberg game.) Data on market shares of brand name and rates of generic prescribing by office based physicians (Masson and Steiner 1985 and Caves 1988). 6 generic products are consistent with this characterization (Comanor 1986, Hurwitz and Caves 1988) . The profit maximizing brand name producer is assumed to face a product market that is divided into two segments: loyal customers (DL) whose demand is unaffected by the price of generic substitutes and a cross-pricesensitive segment (Di) whose demand is influenced by both the brand name and generic prices (Rosenthal 1980 (Wagner and Puffy 1988) , and that the costs of changing both brand name and generic prices are low. This implies that future entry decisions will not be affected by the current brand name price.
The brand name firm is assumed to be aware of this and hence sets price in each time period taking as exogenous the number of current and future generic producers, denoted by n.6 The generic market is characterized by a Nash equilibrium among the n 6Thus, we exclude the possibility of "limit price" behavior. Tirole (1988, Chapter 9) , points out that limit pricing is unlikely under the assumptions we have outlined. He notes that incumbent (brand-name) price may be correlated with productive capacity commitment; however, capacity constraints are probably not an important consideration in producing pharmaceuticals (though they may become more important in the market for biologically-produced products).
Moreover, the Milgrom-Roberts (1982) explanation of limit pricing where incumbent price is an imperfect signal of incumbent cost is also of limited relevance in the pharmaceutical context where production costs are small relative to prices and relative to total firm expenditures on drug development, production, marketing and distribution.
identical firms who take brand name price Cb) as given.7
C. The Model
The brand name producer's demand function is
where Qb is the name brand quantity demanded, P6 and P are the brand name and generic prices respectively, and D1 and represent the loyal and cross-price sensitive segments of the brand name firm's demand function. The market demand function for the n identical generic producers is DG(Pg,Pb) and the equilibrium value of P9 is Pg*(n,Pb).8 This is the profit maximizing value of P9 in a Nash non-cooperative game. Substituting the expression for into equation (1), and denoting the brand name producer's cost function by C(Qb), we write the brand name fin's profit function as
Maximization of profit with respect to own price (rb) yields the first order condition 71n order to examine the sensitivity of our results to the assumption that the generic price is endogenous to the brand-name firm, we also examined a Bertrand model in which this firm takes generic price as exogenous. The analytical results closely parallel the findings reported here.
The relationship between P9 and n can also be derived from more general models where n identical firms have non-zero conjectural variations with respect to each other's output (see for example Waterston (1987) pp.18-20) .
Note that the first term of (3), which summarizes the demand response to a change in b' must be negative for the first order condition to hold. The demand response consists of the direct effects on the two segments of the demand function plus an indirect effect which works through the price reaction function that is determined in the sub-narket for generics. For given values of n, DL(Pb) +D,(P, Pg*(n,Pb)] can be viewed as the reduced-form demand curve for the brand-name firm. Equation (3) requires that this reduced-form demand curve be negatively sloped.'
The effect of entry by generics on name brand price can be assessed by total differentiation of equation (3) to obtain an expression f or dPb/dn. Using this expression, we examine the conditions under which market entry will increase name brand price (dPb/dn>O). (Algebraic detail is supplied in the appendix).
We can express dPb/dn as: /8P, > 0, the reduced form demand curve will be less own-price e1astic than the ordinary demand curve for the brand name drug. Equation (4) shows that dPb/dn can not be positive unless either 1) entry increases the demand tar the brand name drug, 2) marginal costs are decreasing for the brand-name product or 3)
entry makes the reduced-form demand curve steeper (less elastic).
Of course, the first of these possibilities seems rather implausible since it would require that generic prices rise with entry or that brand-name demand falls when generic prices rise (implying that the products are gross complements in demand).
The empirical evidence of the impact on demand suggests at least small reductions in brand name market shares following market entry (Statman 1981) . Little systematic empirical work on the nature of returns to scale has been reported in the literature.
There is, however, little reason to believe that the marginal production costs of a specific drug would be decreasing, nor has this claim appeared in industry studies (Comanor 1986 , Temin 1979 . This leaves the third possibility, that entry makes the reduced-form demand curve steeper, as the most plausible explanation for dPb/dn > 0.
U. Variations in Market Shares of Loyal and Cross-PriceSensitive Consumers
We have already cited evidence pertaining to liMO's, hospital purchasing practices, and Medicaid which suggests that the relative market share of price-sensitive consumers has been increasing. We now consider the implications of this trend for brand-name prices and for the responses of these prices to generic entry. We begin by reformulating the brand-name demand function in equation (1) as a weighted sum
where a is the weight of price-sensitive consumers in the market.
The first-order condition for profit maximization now becomes
The effect of a change in a on the profit-maximizing level of
Note that the numerator of the first r.h.s. term in (5) is proportional to the difference in own-price response of the loyal and cross-price-sensitive reduced-form demand curves while the numerator of the second r.h.s. term is the difference in quantity demanded between the loyal and cross-price-sensitive portions of the market. If •one assumes that the shift of a purchaser from the former to the latter portion (which causes an increase in a)
does not affect the quantity demanded for that purchaser (given 12 prevailing levels of b and Pg) , the second r.h.s. term vanishes.
The first r.h.s. term will be negative (positive) if the ownprice response of the cross-price sensitive demand is greater (lesser) than that of the loyal purchasers. While this might seem plausible, it is not obviously so; in particular, one might expect the response of reduced-form demand to be smaller for the cross-price sensitive purchasers if is strongly positive.
It is also interesting to consider the effect of changes in a on the response of b to entry. Grabowski and Vernon (1990) noted that brand-name price declines in response to entry were more commonly observed for injectable products that are purchased primarily by cross-price-sensitive hospitals. They went on to speculate that in the market for the orally-administered pharmaceuticals which they studied, the effect of expanding the cross-price-sensitive portion of the market (i.e., an increase in a) would be to make dPb/dn more negative. To examine their conjecture explicitly, the relevant expression to evaluate is
In the simple linear case where DL=aL-blPb, D$=a$_bsPb_vn+zpbn, and marginal cost = average cost = the constant m, (7) becomes
dci soc2 + 2ar(Pb-zn) (bL-bs+zn) QSQL
Soc2
Notice that the term (v-z(2Pb-m)) will be negative if dPb/dn>O.
In this case, since SOC<O, sufficient conditions for the validity of the Grabowski-Vernon conjecture are that (bL-b$+zn)<O and (Q-
On the other hand, as noted above, the difference in ownprice responses of the two demand functions, which here equals (b1-b+zn), may not be negative, particularly if is strongly positive. Thus, while our analysis does not controvert the Grabowski-Vernon conjecture, it does point out that there are plausible cases where it does not hold. Finally, note that the same factors which imply a less positive brand-name price response to entry as a increases (i.e., CO and (bL-bS+zn) <O) also imply that dPb/da < 0.
III. Advertising: Extending the Basic Model
There has been a substantial amount of research on the impact of advertising (or promotion) on competition and innovation in the market for pharmaceuticals (Comanor 1986 ). Far less attention appears to have been devoted to the impact of generic entry on brand-name advertising. Since there is empirical evidence (discussed below) that generic entry reduces brand-name advertising, we focus our analysis on exploring the conditions under which this decline in advertising would occur simultaneously with a rise in brand-name price.
Several competitive roles for the influence of advertising on competition have been proposed in the literature. Leffler (1981) describes informational advertising which serves to improve consumer knowledge. The effect of informational advertising for a name brand firm may be to increase aggregate demand for a class of pharmaceuticals, or to increase its own demand if there exist true quality differentials that can be publicized. Persuasive advertising constitutes a second class of promotional activity. This form of advertising is posited to make firm demand curves less price elastic. Comanor (1986) suggested that name brand fins may use advertising to "jam" the informational signal sent by generic entrants thereby reducing the "effective" information received about competitors. Schmalensee (1982) has developed a general model where advertising serves to reinforce existing brand loyalties, which results in name brand demand curves becoming less price elastic. Still others have suggested that advertising raises the costs of entry thereby reducing potential price competitors (Schwartzman 1976 ).
We expand our basic model by adding expenditures on advertising, A, as a second decision variable for the brand name firm. By adding A as an argument in the D1, O, and P* functions the first order condition given in (3) becomes increases the number of persons using a drug or increases the uses to which the drug is put. In this case, the reduction in quantity demanded as entry occurs (and P falls) should also be larger. Advertising could, however, have the opposite result.
If brand-name advertising focuses primarily on differentiating brand-name from genetic products, it may diminish the cross-price sensitivity of brand-name demand and thereby reduce the size of the (negative) demand response to entry. Finally, note that our model does not generate qualitative predictions about the signs of dPb/dn and dAfdn in a number of other cases (see Appendix   Table 1 ). These cases could also be consistent with the observed empirical evidence of simultaneous brand-name price increases and advertising decreases in response to entry.
IV. Empirical Evidence on Pricing. Advertising and Patent Expiration
There are three studies which directly estimate impacts of market entry on name brand prices. Two of the studies make use of data which reflect pricing behavior during the period subsequent to the Drug Act of 1984 (Grabowski and Vernon 1990 and Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz 1991) The earliest study which is relevant to the models developed above is that by Statman (1981) . In that work the pricing behavior of 12 name brand drugs was examined before and after expiration of their patents. The analysis focused on prices and purchases by drug stores. The empirical estimates of price response and market share changes indicated little change in either. On average market share fell to 96% of its initial level. Grabowski and Vernon (1990) studied the effect of generic entry on prices for 18 high sales volume pharmaceutical products that were first exposed to generic competition during the years 1983 through 1987. For each drug the authors examined prices prior to entry and prices 1 year subsequent to generic entry.
Using a rather sparse regression model they estimated the impact of the number of generic suppliers in a market on the ratio of 10Earlier studies of drug pricing by Schwartzman (1976) and Weston (1979) found little evidence of brand-name price responses to entry outside the market for anti-infectives. Moreover, the estimates produced by those studies are somewhat difficult to interpret. Since only simple regression models were estimated, it is not possible to disentangle the impacts of increased competition in a therapeutic market from the aging of particular pharmaceutical products. Most other studies have focused on entry by new drugs into a therapeutic class. That situation is somewhat different from the one examined in the theoretical work above. Some results from those studies are informative for the analysis of patent loss and price competition. The study by Bond and Lean (1977) found that physician prescribing practices were quite unresponsive to newly entering drugs that offer little or no therapeutic gain over the original product. This is not necessarily informative because in our model we view demand stemming from office based physician contacts as falling into the "loyal" market segment; the effect of entry on the price responsive segment of the market is the critical factor in explaining post-entry brand-name price increases.
the generic price to the name brand price.1' The estimated coefficient for the effect of the number of generics on the ratio of generic to name brand price is negative and significant at conventional levels. This result is consistent With the descriptive statistics presented by Grabowski and Vernon (1990) showing that name brand prices rose relative to generic prices subsequent to generic entry.
In an interesting and comprehensive study of generic entry effects on markets for brand-name drugs, Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991) suggest that simple pre-entry versus post-entry brand-name price comparisons or regressions of price on numbers of generic entrants may understate negative entry effects on prices because other omitted factors have caused brand-name prices to rise over time. Lacking observable variables which can explain this deviation from historical patterns, they argue that empirical price regression models must be specified so as to minimize bias from the unobservable, time-varying factors which have produced this result.12 The regression included two covariates along with the number of generics. They were: (1) the total dollar sales in a market in a given year and (2) a time dummy.
'21t should be noted that Berndt, Griliches and Rosett (1990) have argued that rates of increase in the PPI data for drugs over the recent past have been biased upward by a substantial amount.
Their analysis shows that one reason for this bias is the difference in price behavior between the drug products included in The estimate for effect of the number of sellers on the advertising to sales ratio was negative with a t statistic of 1.62 which is significant at the 0.10 level using a two tailed test. The result for total promotional outlays by the leading firm was also negative but no standard error or t statistic was. reported (see footnote #42 in Hurwitz and Caves (1988) ).
ThCaves, Whinston and Hurwitz view their finding of a negative dA/dn as supporting the view that "expanding the overall market for the chemical entity is a significant function of branded-drug advertising." Of course, the analysis in our appendix shows that the sign of dA/dn depends upon a number of different factors in addition to the effect of advertising on the level of demand. Our
22
In summary, the results from the three most relevant empirical studies of brand name pricing are decidedly mixed. The descriptive evidence strongly suggests price increases following entry (Grabowski and Vernon 1990 and Wagner and Duffy 1988) . The nultivariate analyses are less clear on the point. This may in part result from data limitations that hinder the ability to hold constant many relevant factors (Grabowski and Vernon 1990) . None of the studies suggests strong name brand price reductions in response to generic entry. The empirical results for the impact of generic entry on advertising (Hurwitz and Caves 1988; Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz 1991 ) is more consistent in pointing to a strong post-entry decline in advertising, but the number of studies dealing with this issue is still small.
V. Concluding Remarks
The models we have developed above show that price increases in name brand pharmaceutical products stemming from market entry due to patent loss may be explained by optimizing behavior by the name brand producer. On the assumption that marginal drug production costs are approximately constant, analysis of our basic model indicates that a necessary condition for such price increases is that entry leads to a decline in the own-price elasticity of reduced-form brand-name demand. Analysis of a model incorporating advertising shows that with constant marginal costs, sufficient conditions for simultaneous brand-name priceoverall analysis, however, supports this intuition of Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz about the nature of advertising.
increases and advertising decreases in response to entry are that (1) entry leads to a substantial decline in the own-price elasticity of reduced-form brand-name demand;
(2) increased advertising leads to a substantial decrease in the slope of the reduced-form brand-name demand curve; and (3) advertising has a negative effect on the (negative) reduced-form demand response to entry.
We also note that advertising which is market-expanding is most likely to be consistent with conditions (2) and (3). More generally, our analysis shows that the observed patterns of entry effects on prices and advertising can be explained by the properties of the reduced-form brand-name demand function and the nature of brand-name advertising.
Our analysis also examined the implications, for brand-name prices and entry effects on these prices, of relative growth in the cross-price-sensitive share of the demand side of the pharmaceutical market. The principal conclusion was that this relative growth would tend to reduce prices and increase the downward pressure of entry on prices if (1) the process causing this relative growth did not increase the overall level of brandname demand and (2) the reduced-f on demand curve for crossprice-sensitive buyers was more own-price elastic than was the demand curve for other ("loyal") buyers.
One outcome that is consistent with our model and supported by descriptive statistics is that brand-name price rises while the average price (including both brand-name and generic products) of a prescription falls. This would mean that the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984 would be 24 having its desired effect. Moreover, our results at least point to the possibility that name-brand price increases in response to entry will be attenuated as the cross-price-sensitive segment of the market continues to expand.
Future researchers may wish to explore the use of more sophisticated models to probe further the implications of patent loss and entry. One direction for extending this analysis is to incorporate intertemporal demand considerations such as durability of advertising effects (Caves, Whinston and Murwitz 1991) . Grabowski and Vernon (1990) have also suggested extending the model to allow for brand-name price effects on entry; to do so, however, one would need to formulate convincing a priori arguments for limit pricing behavior.
Further empirical research on the structural relationships of our models would also be valuable. Based on our analysis, research on demand for brand-name drugs should focus on the effect of generic prices on own-price demand elasticity for name brands and the effect of advertising on own-price and cross-price elasticities. We are unaware of direct empirical estimates for these factors in the literature. Empirical estimates of the generic price function, P(Pb,A,n), are also needed.15
Another worthwhile direction for future empirical research 15The relative price regressions estimated by Grabowski and Vernon (1990) and Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991) Finally, as Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991) have noted, a more complete understanding of the implications of patent policy obviously requires further research on the entry process itself.
In the only econometric analysis of recent data of which we are aware, Grabowski and Vernon (1990) have estimated a generic entry model and reported that the brand-name price-cost margin at the time of the first generic entry is the most important determinant of the number of generic entrants. In view of concerns about limit pricing models expressed above, the reasons for this connection between mark-ups and entry are an obvious subject for further inquiry.
APPENDIX COMPARATIVE STATICS ANALYSIS OF ENTRY EFFECTS
ON BRAND-NAME PRICES
Thasic Model
We begin by noting that the second-order maximization condition corresponding to equation (3) From the second-order conditions, we know that (F") < 0, [Ab] o, and the denominators of (A9) and (AlO) are negative and positive respectively.
Predictions about the signs of dPbJdn and dA/dn now depend upon the signs of n', nb, and A' as shown in Appendix Table 1 .
Under the maintained assumption that marginal costs are constant, 
